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Report on Statewide Attorney Discipline: Uniformity and Fairness

by Hal R. Lieberman
Published in New York Law Journal,
  • Attorney Disciplinary Proceedings
  • Attorney Discipline Defense
  • Due Process
  • Sanctions

    • On March 30, 2015, Chief Judge Jonathan Lippman announced the formation of a Commission on Statewide Attorney Discipline, to be made up of leaders from New York’s bench and bar (the author was on the commission). The stated mission was to “conduct a comprehensive review of [New York’s] attorney disciplinary system to determine what is […]

    Reprinted with permission from the “October 23, 2015″ edition of the “New York Law Journal”© “2015” ALM Media Properties, LLC. All rights reserved. Further duplication without permission is prohibited. For information, contact 877-257-3382 – reprints@alm.com or visit www.almreprints.com.

    1. Report of the Commission on Statewide Attorney Discipline, September 2015.

    2. See Stephen Gillers, “Lowering the Bar: How Lawyer Discipline in New York Fails to Protect the Public,” 17 N.Y.U. J. Legis. & Pub. Pol’y 485 (2014).

    3. Report at 47 (emphasis added).

    4. See 22 NYCRR Parts 603, 605 [1st Dept.]; 22 NYCRR Part 691 [2d Dept.]; 22 NYCRR Part 806 [3d Dept.]; 22 NYCRR Part 1022 [4th Dept.].

    5. Report at 47.

    6. Matter of Dunn, 22 N.Y.3d 699, 3 N.Y.S.3d 751 (2015).

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    Appellate Review of Disciplinary Decisions

    by Hal R. Lieberman
    Published in New York Law Journal, May 29, 2013
  • General
  • Procedural

    • What appellate remedies are available for a New York lawyer aggrieved by a disciplinary decision of a special referee or hearing panel? The short answer is, “win below,” because opportunities for judicial review are limited, and the likelihood of reversal or modification is not high. This is especially true when a disciplinary determination is based, […]

    Reprinted with permission from the May 29, 2013 edition of the New York Law Journal ©2013 ALM Media Properties, LLC. All rights reserved. Further duplication without permission is prohibited. For information, contact 877-257-3382 – reprints@alm.com or visit www.almreprints.com.

    1. See 22 NYCRR §605.12(f)(1), 22 NYCRR §691.5-a(a), 22 NYCRR §806.5, and 22 NYCRR §1022.20(d)(1).
    1. See 22 NYCRR §605.13(q)(1).
    1. See 22 NYCRR §605.14.
    1. 22 NYCRR §605.14(g). In fact, hearing panels do modify with reasonable frequency, so this is one of the few opportunities for appellate “relief” in New York.
    1. 22 NYCRR §605.15(e)(1).
    1. See, e.g., In re Dale, 87 A.D.3d 198, 200, 927 N.Y.S.2d 267 (4th Dept. 2011) (“when the resolution of issues in [an attorney] disciplinary proceeding depends upon the credibility of witnesses, a referee’s findings are entitled to great weight”).
    1. See 22 NYCRR §806.5 [Third Department] (“The court shall refer issues of fact to a judge or referee to hear and report. If no factual issue is raised, the court may, upon application of either party, fix a time at which the attorney may be heard in mitigation or otherwise, or the court may refer the matter for such purpose”); 22 NYCRR §1022.20(d)(2) [Fourth Department] (“When no issue of fact is raised, or after completion of the hearing and report on such issue, the Appellate Division shall fix a time at which the respondent may be heard in mitigation or otherwise, unless the respondent waives in writing the privilege to be heard”).
    1. Mildner v. Gulotta, 405 F.Supp. 182, 213-14 (E.D.N.Y. 1976) (Weinstein, J., dissenting). Judge Jack Weinstein stated: The importance of oral argument before the fact finding court to assist it in drawing inferences and evaluating probative force of the evidence cannot be underestimated. It is an essential part of the trial which may not be denied to a litigant. The Supreme Court has just reemphasized this point in declaring unconstitutional a New York practice permitting the court to deny counsel the opportunity to make a summation at the end of a criminal case tried without a jury.
    1. Judiciary Law §90(8), citing N.Y. Const. Art. VI §3, which provides, in pertinent part, that an appeal may be taken as of right from a judgment or order of an Appellate Division which finally determines an action or proceeding that directly involves the construction of the constitution of the state or of the United States, or where one or more justices of the Appellate Division dissents from the determination of the court; see also Matter of Healy, 8 N.Y.2d 1137, 209 N.Y.S.2d 819 (1960) (appeal to the Court of Appeals from a disbarment will not lie as of right where no constitutional question is involved).
    1. Id.CPLR 5602(a)(1).
    2. CPLR 5602(a)(1).
    1. To be clear, however, a lawyer may make successive motions for leave, by first applying for leave from the Appellate Division and then, if leave is denied, by seeking leave from the Court of Appeals within the relevant time period after denial by the lower court.
    1. See, e.g., Del Bello v. Westchester County Bar Ass’n, 19 N.Y.2d 466, 472, 280 N.Y.S.2d 651, 655 (1967).
    1. Id.
    1. See, e.g., Matter of Citrin, 94 N.Y.2d 459, 706 N.Y.S.2d 72 (2000) (before denying a disbarred attorney’s reinstatement application, the Appellate Division has to provide the applicant with a copy of the report of the Committee on Character and Fitness so that the applicant might address any issues presented in the report).
    1. Matter of Zalk, 10 N.Y.3d 669, 862 N.Y.S.2d 305 (2008) (Dead Man’s Statute did not apply to preclude attorney from testifying).
    1. See, e.g., Matter of Mitchell, 40 N.Y.2d 153, 386 N.Y.S.2d 95 (1976) (attorney does not suffer deprivation of due process by virtue of fact that he has been disbarred during the pendency of an appeal of his conviction of a felony which formed the basis for his disbarment).
    1. Matter of Galasso, 19 N.Y.3d 688, 954 N.Y.S.2d 784 (2012) (affirming suspension of attorney for failure to maintain vigilance over client funds even when an employee committed the misappropriation of funds without the attorney’s involvement or knowledge).
    1. Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37 (1971).
    1. Id. at 44.
    1. Moore v. Sims, 442 U.S. 415, 426 (1975).
    1. Middlesex County Ethics Committee v. Garden State Bar Ass’n, 457 U.S. 423 (1982).
    1. The two exceptions, where the federal courts permitted actions for injunctive relief to proceed, involved judges subject to judicial disciplinary proceedings, Butler v. The Alabama Judicial Inquiry Commission, 111 F.Supp.2d 1241 (M.D. Alabama, 2000) and Fink v. Supreme Court of Pennsylvania, 651 F.Supp. 1238 (M.D. Pennsylvania, 1987).
    1. Rooker v. Fidelity Trust, 263 U.S. 413 (1923) and District of Columbia Court of Appeals v. Feldman, 460 U.S. 462 (1983).
    1. See Exxon Mobil v. Saudi Basic Industries, 544 U.S. 280 (2005) (affirming that the Rooker-Feldman doctrine was based on the certiorari jurisdiction statute, 28 U.S.C. §1257, and holding that it applies in cases “brought by state-court losers complaining of injuries caused by state-court judgments” rendered before district court proceedings commenced and inviting district court review and rejection of those judgments).

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    New York’s Attorney Discipline System: Does It Meet ‘Due Process’ Requirements?

    by Hal R. Lieberman
    Published in New York Law Journal, Dec 28, 2012
  • General
  • Procedural

    • This is the last in a series of three columns on the subject of due process and New York’s discipline system.  The first two articles focused, respectively, on (1) the historical, constitutional development of due process rights in attorney discipline cases, both nationally and in New York,[1] and (2) particular aspects of New York’s discipline […]

    Reprinted with permission from the August 31, 2012 edition of the New York Law Journal ©2012 ALM Media Properties, LLC. All rights reserved. Further duplication without permission is prohibited. For information, contact 877-257-3382 – reprints@alm.com or visit www.almreprints.com.

    [1] Hal R. Lieberman, “New York’s Attorney Discipline System: How Much Process Is ‘Due’?,” N.Y.L.J., April 4, 2012.

    [2] Hal R. Lieberman, “New York’s Attorney Discipline System: Does it Meet ‘Due Process’ Requirements?,” N.Y.L.J., August 31, 2012.

    [3] See 22 NYCRR §§ 603.4(e)(1)(i); 691.4(l)(1)(i); 806.4(f)(1)(i); 1022.20(d)(3)(d).

    [4] See, e.g., Matter of Boter, 27 A.D.3d 137 (1st Dep’t 2006) (interim suspension ordered based on attorney’s lack of cooperation); Matter of Hamerman, 211 A.D.2d 85 (2nd Dep’t 1995) (failure to respond to Grievance Committee’s demands); Matter of Ashe, 300 A.D.2d 737 (3rd Dep’t 2002) (suspension of attorney until such time as she complied with court issued subpoena duces tecum).

    [5] 385 U.S. 511, 87 S. Ct. 625 (1967).

    [6] See, e.g., Matter of Harris, 97 A.D.3d 96, 98 (1st Dep’t 2012) (“[W]hile the inference from respondent’s invocation of his Fifth Amendment privilege may not alone permit a finding of misconduct, the bank records obtained by the Committee together with that inference sufficiently demonstrate that respondent engaged in professional misconduct by misappropriating or converting escrow funds[.]”) (citation omitted).

    [7] 22 NYCRR §§ 603.5(a), 691.5(a), 806.4(e), and 1022.19(d).

    [8] See, e.g., 22 NYCRR § 605.17(b).  Note, however, that it is generally the practice of committee staff counsel to provide access to the evidence and the names of witnesses that the staff intends to introduce in its case in chief.  In the First Department, 22 NYCRR § 605.13(a) requires staff counsel and the respondent (or her attorneys) to hold a pre-hearing conference five days after the answer is served and to complete and sign a pre-hearing stipulation in conformance with the form set forth in 22 NYCRR § 605.12(d).  The form calls for the parties to specify, inter alia, the undisputed facts, the parties’ contentions, documents to be offered in evidence during the hearing, and witnesses to be called.

    [9] 596 A.2d 592 (D.C.App. 1991).

    [10] Id. at 595 (citations omitted).  The Court went on to hold that the Hearing Committee had properly permitted the respondent “reasonable discovery,” under any feasible definition of that term, when it granted a portion of the respondent’s discovery request for various documents from the complainant, a former client, but denied what it deemed to be the respondent’s otherwise broad demands.

    [11] 417 Mass. 81 (1994).

    [12] 576 F.2d 380, 386 (1st Cir. 1978).

    [13] 417 Mass. at 87 (citation omitted).  However, because the respondent failed to seek any discovery orders through procedures available to attorneys in Massachusetts disciplinary proceedings, the Court concluded that “[respondent] cannot now claim he was denied due process.” Id. at  87-88.

    [14]  The Model Enforcement Rules are available at http://www.americanbar.org/groups/professional_responsibility/resources/lawyer_ethics_regulation/model_rules_for_lawyer_disciplinary_enforcement.html.

    [15] National Labor Relations Board v. Amalgamated Clothing Workers of America, AFL-CIO, Local 990, 430 F.2d 966 (5th Cir. 1970); see also ABA Model Enforcement Rule 11(6) [“Upon conclusion of the proceedings, the court shall promptly enter an appropriate order.  The decision of the court shall be in writing and state the reasons for the decision.” (emphasis added)].

    [16] 22 NYCRR §§ 806.5; 1022.20(d)(2).  All lawyers may, of course, make written submissions.

    [17] Mildner v. Gulotta, 405 F.Supp. 182, 213-14 (E.D.N.Y. 1976) (citation omitted) (Weinstein, J., dissenting).

    [18] See Model Enforcement Rule 11(6)(1) (“Within [sixty] days after the court grants review, the respondent and disciplinary counsel may file briefs and present oral arguments pursuant to the rules governing civil appeals.”); see also Matter of Ruffalo, 390 U.S. 544 (1968) (disbarment proceedings “are adversary proceedings of a quasi-criminal nature”).  The Second Circuit has expanded upon Ruffalo, explaining that “a court’s disciplinary proceeding against a member of its bar is comparable to a criminal rather than to a civil proceeding.” United States v. Private Sanitation Indus. Assoc. of Nassau/Suffolk, Inc., 44 F.3d 1082, 1086 (2d Cir. 1995), quoting Erdmann v. Stevens, 458 F.2d 1205, 1209 (2d Cir. 1973).  The New York State Court of Appeals has acknowledged the quasi-criminal nature of disciplinary proceedings.  Matter of Kelly, 23 N.Y.2d 368, 384, 296 N.Y.S.2d 937, 951 (1968).

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    Attorney Discipline System: Does it Meet ‘Due Process’ Requirements?

    by Hal R. Lieberman
    Published in New York Law Journal, August 31, 2012
  • General
  • Procedural

    • In a previous column,1 we focused on the historical constitutional development of due process rights in attorney discipline cases, and briefly highlighted the relatively few New York cases addressing procedural due process rights accorded to New York lawyers facing disciplinary charges. This article attempts to drill down by discussing several particular aspects of New York’s […]

    Reprinted with permission from the August 31, 2012 edition of the New York Law Journal ©2012 ALM Media Properties, LLC. All rights reserved. Further duplication without permission is prohibited. For information, contact 877-257-3382 – reprints@alm.com or visit www.almreprints.com.

    1. Hal R. Lieberman, “New York’s Attorney Discipline System: How Much Process Is ‘Due’?” NYLJ, April 4, 2012.
    2. The Model Enforcement Rules are available at http://www.americanbar.org/groups/professional_responsibility/resources/lawyer_ethics_regulation/model_rules_for_lawyer_disciplinary_enforcement.html.
    3. 67 N.Y.2d 440 (1986).
    4. Id.
    5. 79 N.Y.2d 520 (1992).
    6. Id. at 525 (citations omitted).
    7. 22 N.Y.C.R.R. §603.4(e)(2).
    8. In any case, an interimly suspended attorney would be well advised to request a prompt post-suspension hearing, if grounds exist, and in that regard should fully cooperate with the disciplinary investigation if prior non-cooperation contributed to the interim suspension.
    9. 118 A.D.2d 15 (1st Dept. 1986).
    1. See, e.g., Matter of Slater, 156 A.D.2d 89 (1st Dept. 1990); Matter of Ryan, 189 A.D.2d 96 (1st Dept. 1993); Matter of MacKenzie, 32 A.D.3d 189 (2d Dept. 2006); Matter of Klarer, 66 A.D.3d 247 (2d Dept. 2009); Matter of Capoccia, 272 A.D.2d 838 (3d Dept. 2000).
    2. Matter of Schwartz, 24 N.Y.2d 65 (1969).
    3. Id.
    4. See Hal R. Lieberman, “Use of Collateral Estoppel in Attorney Disciplinary Proceedings,” NYLJ, July 27, 1998; see also Commissioner of the State Insurance Fund v. Low, 3 NY2d 590 (1958) (describing collateral estoppel as “essentially a rule of justice and fairness,” but one that can also be “elusive and difficult to apply”).
    5. Matter of Capoccia, 59 N.Y.2d 549 (1983); Matter of Friedman, 196 A.D.2d 280 (1st Dept. 1994).
    6. 390 U.S. 544 (1968).
    7. The respondent in Matter of Friedman petitioned the U.S. Supreme Court for a writ of certiorari, which the Court denied on Oct. 3, 1994. 513 U.S. 820 (1994).
    8. Model Enforcement Rule 18.3.
    9. See N.Y. A.P.A. §306(1).
    10. 10 N.Y.3d 669 (2008).
    11. Model Enforcement Rule 18.2.

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    New York’s Attorney Discipline System: How Much ‘Process’ Is ‘Due’?

    by Hal R. Lieberman
    Published in New York Law Journal, April 4, 2012
  • General
  • Procedural

    • This article concerns the due process rights of New York lawyers facing disciplinary charges. It highlights the historical constitutional development of due process rights in attorney discipline cases, briefly focuses on the relatively few precedents that address procedural due process in New York’s uniquely disjointed lawyer disciplinary system, and then describes the ABA’s Model Rules […]

    Reprinted with permission from the March1, 2010 edition of the New York Law Journal ©2010 ALM Media Properties, LLC. All rights reserved. Further duplication without permission is prohibited. For information, contact 877-257-3382 – reprints@alm.com or visit www.almreprints.com.

    1. 22 U.S. 529 (1824).
    1. 71 U.S. 333 (1866).
    1. 74 U.S. 364 (1868).
    1. Id. at 375.
    1. 390 U.S. 544 (1968).
    1. Id. at 551.
    1. 385 U.S. 511 (1967).
    1. 501 U.S. 1030 (1991).
    1. In Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37 (1971) and its progeny, the U.S. Supreme Court espoused a strong federal policy against federal court interference with pending state judicial proceedings absent extraordinary circumstances. The basis for “Younger abstention” is the notion of “comity,” which includes “a proper respect for state functions.” Id. at 44. Accordingly, where vital state interests are involved, a federal court should abstain “unless state law clearly bars the interposition of the constitutional claims.” Moore v. Sims, 442 U.S. 415, 426 (1975). In Middlesex County Ethics Committee v. Garden State Bar Ass’n, 457 U.S. 423 (1982), the Supreme Court applied “Younger abstention” to bar disciplinary proceedings. In brief, federal courts will generally abstain from stopping a state disciplinary proceeding after it has begun. Moreover, the “Rooker-Feldman” doctrine, named for two Supreme Court cases interpreting federal subject matter jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. §1257, limits review of state disciplinary proceedings, once they are over, to the U.S. Supreme Court through a petition for a writ of certiorari.
    1. 24 N.Y.2d 150 (1969) (affirming the principle in an administrative proceeding).
    1. 23 N.Y.2d 368 (1968).
    1. Id. at 384.
    1. 63 N.Y.2d 331 (1984).
    1. Id. at 339.
    1. 59 N.Y.2d 549 (1983).
    1. 67 N.Y.2d 440 (1986).
    1. Id. at 201-202.
    1. Id. at 220.
    1. In the 1960s, an American Bar Association commission chaired by former U.S. Supreme Court Justice Tom Clark conducted a comprehensive study of bar discipline systems throughout the United States. The Clark Commission issued a scathing report in 1970, which described the state of lawyer discipline as a “scandalous” process. See Special Comm. on Evaluation of Disciplinary Enforcement, American Bar Ass’n, Problems and Recommendations in Disciplinary Enforcement 1 (1970). The Clark Commission’s findings became a catalyst for action. By the mid-1970s, many state courts around the country assumed greater responsibility for managing their disciplinary processes and hired professional lawyers and investigators to staff disciplinary agencies. The ABA’s House of Delegates adopted the Model Enforcement Rules in August 1989, and amended them in 1993, 1996, 1999, and 2002.
    1. The ABA Model Enforcement Rules are available at http://www.americanbar.org/groups/professional_responsibility/resources/lawyer_ethics_regulation/model_rules_for_lawyer_disciplinary_enforcement.html.
    1. See, e.g., Mark J. Fucile, “Giving Lawyers Their Due: Due Process Defenses in Disciplinary Proceedings,” 20 No. 4 Prof. Law. 28 (2011); Mary M. Devlin, “The Development of Attorney Disciplinary Procedures in the United States,” 2008 Prof. Law. 359 (2008); Wilburn Brewer, Jr., “Due Process in Lawyer Disciplinary Cases: From the Cradle to the Grave,” 42 S.C. L. Rev. 925 (1991).

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    Q & A With Hal R. Lieberman

    by Kris Fischer
    Published in New York Law Journal, March 25, 2011
  • General
  • Procedural
  • Substantive

    • Attorneys who bully or neglect their clients, steal from escrow accounts, overbill, lie to authorities and generally ignore the Code of Professional Responsibility have been the focus of Hal R. Lieberman’s practice for more than 25 years. Mr. Lieberman honed his skills in the legal ethics and professional liability field as assistant bar counsel in […]

    Reprinted with permission from the March 25, 2011 edition of the New York Law Journal ©2011 ALM Media Properties, LLC. All rights reserved. Further duplication without permission is prohibited. For information, contact 877-257-3382 – reprints@alm.com or visit www.almreprints.com.

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    New York’s Lawyer Disciplinary System; Is It Fair?

    by Hal R. Lieberman
    Published in New York Law Journal, May 1, 2010
  • General
  • Procedural

    • Professional Responsibility One of the hallmarks of a fair and properly functioning disciplinary system is even-handed treatment of the principal participants in that system, to wit, complainants and respondent lawyers. Unfortunately, because of its disjointed grievance structure, whereby each of the four appellate departments separately and non-uniformly oversees all aspects of attorney discipline in its geographic […]

    Reprinted with permission from the March 1, 2010 edition of the New York Law Journal ©2010 ALM Media Properties, LLC. All rights reserved. Further duplication without permission is prohibited. For information, contact 877-257-3382 – reprints@alm.com or visit www.almreprints.com.

    1 See 22 NYCRR 691.4(m), 806.4(g), 1022.20(d)(3).

    2 See 22 NYCRR 605.14(d).

    3 See 22 NYCRR 605.22(b).

    4 See 22 NYCRR 1022.20(c)(2).

    5 See 22 NYCRR 1022.20(d)(1).

    6 See 22 NYCRR 1022.20(d)(2).

    7 See 22 NYCRR 806.5.

    8 See 22 NYCRR 102.20(d)(1).

    9 This situation is allayed to some extent by the attorney’s right to be heard in mitigation by the Appellate Division pursuant to 22 NYCRR 1022.20(d)(2). Pointedly, however, disciplinary decisions in the Fourth Department manifest a conspicuous lack of citation to case law or details as to mitigation.

    10 See 22 NYCRR 605.13(q) and 605.13-a(g).

    11 See 22 NYCRR 605.5, 605.7, 605.15.

    12 See, e.g.,

    , 7A.D.3d 37, 774 N.Y.S.2d 522 (1st Dept. 2004) (citing previously issued Letters of Caution as grounds for imposing an enhanced suspension).

    13 See 22 NYCRR 691.6(a).

    14 See 22 NYCRR 637.6(a).

    15 See 22 NYCRR 691.6(c).

    16 See 22 NYCRR 806.4(c)(1)(ii).

    17 See 22 NYCRR 806.4(c)(c)(iv).

    18 See 22 NYCRR 1022.19(d)(2)(v).

    19 See 22 NYCRR 1022.19(d)(2)(iv).

    20 See 22 NYCRR 1022.19(d)(2)(v).

    21 , 10 A.D.3d 141, 144 (1st Dept. 2004).

    22 See , 308 A.D.2d 180 (1st Dept. 2003).

    23 See, e.g., , 67 A.D.3d 70 (2d Dept. 2009) (three-year suspension for conversion); , 51 A.D.3d 294 (2d Dept. 2008) (five-year suspension for conversion of client funds where attorney with past disciplinary history also commingled monies, charged excessive fees, and displayed a lack of candor during his disciplinary proceeding).

    24 See, e.g., , A.D.3d, 2009 slip op. 09944 (4th Dept. Dec. 30, 2009) (three-month suspension for conversion during period of personal financial difficulties); , 46 A.D.3d 167 (4th Dept. 2007) (six-month suspension for conversion by attorney who was suffering from depression).

    25 See, e.g., , 62 A.D.3d 1205 (3d Dept. 2009) (one-year suspension in conversion case stayed upon condition that attorney obtain extra continuing legal education credits); , 52 A.D.3d 1110 (3d Dept. 2008) (one-year suspension stayed upon condition that attorney submit quarterly reports from a certified public accountant attesting to sound account management practices); , 27 A.D.3d 947 (3d Dept. 2006) (two-year suspension stayed upon condition that attorney submit satisfactory quarterly reports from an accountant and mental health professional).

    26 See, e.g., , 62 A.D.3d 151 (1st Dept. 2009) (censure despite failure to file for five years);

    , 243 A.D.2d 75 (1st Dept. 1998) (censure despite failure to file for 9 years);

    , 257 A.D.2d 209 (1st Dept. 1999) (censure despite failure to file for six years);

    , 243 A.D.2d 69 (1st Dept. 1998);

    , 221 A.D.2d 28 (1st Dept. 1996);

    , 179 A.D.2d 15 (1st Dept. 1992).

    27 See, e.g.,

    , 66 A.D.3d 377 (2d Dept. 2009) (censure despite failure to file for five years);

    , 291 A.D.2d 194 (2d Dept. 2002);

    , 290 A.D.2d 177 (2002);

    , 241 A.D.2d 260 (2d Dept. 1998) (censure despite failure to file for four years);

    , 244 A.D.2d 146 (2d Dept. 1998) (censure despite failure to file for 2 years);

    , 182 A.D.2d 168 (2d Dept. 1992).

    28 See, e.g.,

    , 275A.D.2d 115 (2d Dept. 2000) (one-year suspension “notwithstanding the mitigation offered”).

    29 See, e.g.,

    , 158 A.D.2d 87 (4th Dept. 1990) (six-month suspension for failure to file for two years);

    , 120 A.D.2d 72 (4th Dept. 1986) (six-month suspension for failure to file for four years).

    30 See, e.g.,

    , 166 A.D.2d 870 (3d Dept. 1990) (three-month suspension, in view of mitigating circumstances);

    , 166 A.D.2d 871 (3d Dept. 1990) (three-month suspension, in view of mitigating circumstances);

    , 92 A.D.2d 978 (3d Dept. 1983) (three-month suspension for failing to file for one year);

    , 90 A.D.2d 561 (3d Dept. 1982) (three-month suspension for failing to file for one year);

    , 71 A.D.2d 969 (3d Dept. 1979) (three-month suspension for six counts of failing to file tax returns).

    31 See NYCRR Parts 603 and 605 [First Department]; Part 691 [Second Department]; Part 806 [Third Department]; Part 1022 [Fourth Department].

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